This study investigates the pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area on the basis of comparable surveys conducted, in a decentralised way, by nine Eurosystem national central banks (NCBs). Overall, more than 10,000 firms participated in the survey, providing evidence for the euro area on issues such as price setting practices, price adjustment mechanisms, reasons for price stickiness and asymmetries in pricing behaviour. Despite a small number of differences observed in the national surveys, the results are very robust across countries. Firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets where prices are mostly set following standard mark-up rules, although competitors' prices also affect price setting strategies. Firm-customer relationships are very important and price discrimination across customers is rather frequent. Price stickiness arises both at the stage when firms review their prices and again when they actually implement changes. In the reviewing process, about half of the firms follow both time and state dependent rules, whereas less than 40% adopt "mainly" time-dependent ones. Prices are reviewed more often than they are changed; most firms adjust their prices only once a year. The most relevant factors underlying price rigidity are explicit or implicit contracts, cost-based pricing and co-ordination failure. Firms adjust prices asymmetrically in response to shocks, depending on the direction of the adjustment and the source of the shock: while cost shocks have a greater impact when prices have to be raised than when they have to be reduced, falls in demand are more likely to induce a price change than increases in demand.
An ad hoc survey on pricing behaviour: how and why?
In the course of 2003 and 2004, nine Eurosystem NCBs conducted ad hoc surveys on firms' pricing behaviour in their respective countries. These surveys were carried out within the framework of the Eurosystem IPN, a research network that was set up to achieve a better understanding of inflation persistence in the euro area. Surveys were conducted in Belgium (BE) (Aucremanne and Druant, 2004) , Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR) (Loupias and Ricart, 2004) , Italy (IT) (Fabiani, Gattulli and Sabbatini, 2004) , Luxembourg 1 (LU), the Netherlands (NL) (Hoeberichts and Stokman, 2004) , Austria (AT) (Kwapil, Scharler and Baumgartner, 2004) and Portugal (PT) (Martins, 2004) . The purpose of these surveys was to collect further information to complement the quantitative price data (Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Producer Price Index (PPI) micro data and macro-economic time series) which are also analysed by the research network.
Relative to quantitative data, surveys have the comparative advantage of being able to document, in qualitative terms, the underlying rationale of the observed pricing patterns. In particular, they can provide insights into the relative importance of nominal versus real rigidities, address separately the two stages in the price adjustment process (i.e. the reviewing stage and the implementation stage), and be used as a basis on which to assess the reasons for price stickiness and asymmetries. CPI and PPI quantitative data, on the contrary, only provide information as to the final outcome of the price adjustment process. Moreover, these data do not offer the possibility of checking whether prices are set in a fully optimising way, whereas surveys can address this issue by directly asking firms which type of information they use when they review their prices.
Clearly, surveys have the disadvantage of providing information that is mainly qualitative, which implies that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the precise importance of a given statement. Moreover, they do not have a time dimension, which means that they cannot be used in order to assess whether pricing patterns change over time. Finally, the quality of the answers provided by the respondents is surrounded by some degree of uncertainty. In this respect, it is however reassuring that the nine national surveys reveal the existence of important common patterns that do not appear to depend on the way the survey was conducted, the number of questions addressed, the precise wording and the ordering of the questions and the options within a particular question. Results are therefore characterised by a high degree of robustness that is further strengthened by the fact that the nine national surveys were carried out under different business cycle conditions. The number of respondents in each country ranged from 333 to almost 2,000. All together, more than 10,000 companies in the euro area were surveyed.
The sectoral coverage was limited to manufacturing in some countries, while in others pricing behaviour in construction was also investigated, trade and services (see Appendix A for a description of the main characteristics of the national surveys and Appendix B for the English translation of the national questionnaires for the industrial sector). 3 Notwithstanding the differences in the national studies, a number of common characteristics can be observed in the full set of results from all of the countries. This paper focuses mainly on these common features -presented as "stylised facts" -while also highlighting some of the more important aspects -presented as "facts" -which are available only for some countries.
The country surveys provide evidence on the following issues:
-the environment in which firms operate; -the methods used by firms to set prices; -the methods used by firms to review and change prices and the frequency with which this takes place;
-possible reasons for price stickiness;
-the existence of asymmetries in pricing behaviour;
-differences across sectors and size classes with regard to the aforementioned areas of interest.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the main common features of the various national surveys and studies. The main results are presented in Section 3, which focuses on various aspects of firms' pricing behaviour, namely how firms set their prices, how they review and eventually change them, and how they adjust their prices in response to different types of shocks. Section 4 concludes.
What can be compared across national studies?
The national surveys share a number of common features, which allow a meaningful comparison to be made, despite the decentralised approach followed. The surveys all focus on the pricing behaviour in respect of the firm's main product, which generally accounts for 60% or more of the turnover of the respondents. In other words, the scope of the survey is much broader than might perhaps have been expected from the single or main product approach.
This section describes the features that are comparable across national studies and addresses those differences, which may hinder comparisons. 4 In this context, we refer to sectoral coverage, firm size, the main characteristics of the markets in which the companies operate and some specific questions in the questionnaires. 3 In some cases, the questionnaire sent to non-industrial companies differed somewhat, mainly to take account of different product types. 4 The survey characteristics (when and by whom the surveys were conducted, the survey method and the sample design) may have a significant but quantitatively difficult to determine impact on the results. The same applies to the different weighting procedures adopted by the NCBs and to the fact that the surveys where conducted in different languages.
Comparability with respect to sectoral coverage and firm size
An important factor in comparing the country results is the sectoral coverage, which, as shown in Table 1 , varies across the national surveys. While some countries cover more or less the entire economy, others concentrate on the industrial sector.
Overall, there appears to be a reasonably solid basis for comparing the industrial and the services sectors across countries. In the case of the trade sector, which is covered in five country studies, the number of firms surveyed seems to be sufficient to allow a meaningful comparison. Conversely, the coverage of the construction sector, both in terms of countries and numbers of firms included in the various samples, is not sufficient. Consequently, Section 3 presents the results for the total sample, industry, trade and other services, with the aim of comparing sectoral patterns. 5 In the cases of Spain, France and Italy information is available on the food-producing sector; the corresponding findings are presented separately (see Box 4). 
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Note: (1) Percentages for the euro area are computed on the basis of the absolute figures reported in brackets, which are the sum of the firms in each category over the nine countries. Notes: (1) In the Netherlands, the size classes are defined as follows: 1-49; ≥50. -(2) Percentages for the euro area are computed on the basis of absolute figures, which are the sum of the firms in each category over the nine countries (not reported in the Table) .
The national surveys cover firms of different sizes in terms of numbers of employees (Table 2) . Since it can be assumed that a firm's size matters from the point of view of pricing behaviour, not only because of the generally different environment in which large and small firms operate, the differences in size structures of the various samples should be taken into 5 The industrial sector covers Sections D and E of the NACE Rev. 1 classification (manufacturing; electricity, gas and water supply), while trade covers Section G (retail and wholesale trade) and services other than trade covers Sections H, I and K (hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; real estate, renting and business activities). account when comparing results across countries. In order to explore these differences, results are given for the following size classes: 1-49 employees, 50-199 employees, 200 employees and above. For the Netherlands, findings on pricing behaviour for 1-employee firms are also available and are presented separately (see Box 3).
Main characteristics of the market in which the firm operates
The environment and the structure of the market are crucial determinants for a firm's pricing behaviour. It is therefore important to establish whether a firm operates on the domestic or on the foreign market, whether its relationships are mainly with other firms or with consumers and whether these relationships are long-standing or occasional in nature. Moreover, the degree of market competition is a key factor in the pricing strategy of a firm.
The national surveys ask very similar questions on the above-mentioned characteristics, with some qualifications. In particular, the questionnaires differ with respect to the reference market, i.e. some country questionnaires ask about pricing in the domestic market (DE, FR, LU) and others about pricing in the main market (BE, ES, IT, AT), while in the remaining questionnaires the market is not specified. 6 To infer reliable results for the euro area, it is important that the responses of the majority of firms refer to the domestic (national) market or at least to the euro area. The top part of Table 3 shows that, for all countries, this is indeed the case for the industrial sector. 7 The openness of individual euro area countries is reflected by the fact that around 30% of the respondents have a foreign market as the main market for their main product and that in many cases this market is a euro area country. For some countries, data is provided on the pricing behaviour of companies in foreign markets (pricing-to-market); accordingly, this information is given separately (see Box 1). The fact that the majority of the companies (75% on average) sell their main product predominantly to other firms (Table 3 , item 2) may possibly be a reflection of the dominance of the industrial sector in the national samples. This suggests that the survey results refer mostly to the behaviour of producer prices rather than to consumer prices.
Most of the companies (an average of 70% in the euro area) have some sort of longterm relationship with their customers (Table 3 , item 3), which may act as a kind of "implicit" contract. In the case of Italy the share is particularly high, but it refers to companies that have long-term relationships with other companies. 8 Item 4 of Table 3 shows how respondents perceive the degree of competition they face in their main market, proxied by the importance they attribute to competitors' prices in influencing a reduction in their own prices (unimportant, of minor importance, important, very important). Although the majority of the firms perceive that competition is high or very high, the share of those operating in an environment of weak competition (very low and low) is on average just below 40%. It is worth remarking that the national surveys also ask firms to report information on other measures of market competition, such as the number of competitors in their main market or their market share. These indicators, however, do not help to explain differences across pricing patterns and in the end are poor measures of how a firm's behaviour is affected by the degree of competition.
All in all, the evidence on market characteristics provided by the surveys shows that firms in the euro area operate in a monopolistically competitive environment and that relationships with customers are important and of a long-standing nature.
Comparability with respect to key questions on pricing behaviour
All the national studies concentrate on the same key questions on pricing behaviour. These questions can be used for a broad comparison despite the fact that their specific formulation and level of detail may differ.
Price setting -Two aspects of price setting are discussed in Section 3. First, the relative importance of three price setting practices (mark-up pricing, price orientated on price of main competitor, other methods) is presented. Second, the findings on price discrimination are discussed, although information is not available for all countries.
Price reviewing -All national surveys include questions on price reviewing and adjustment practices and frequencies. In particular, three aspects are covered under this topic: first, the price reviewing method (time or state-dependent rules, or a combination of both); second, the frequency of price reviews; third the frequency of price changes. In the case of the latter, there is some heterogeneity across countries regarding the reference year (some surveys ask about a specific year while others are more general), but this fact should not be an obstacle for comparison. Evidence on the set of information firms take into account when they review their price is also presented.
Factors behind price stickiness -With regard to the reasons underlying price stickiness, the national surveys offer a range of possible theoretical explanations. It is possible to present cross-country evidence to support ten popular theories (explicit and implicit contracts, temporary shocks, menu costs, pricing threshold, co-ordination failure, cost-based pricing, judging quality by price, changes in non-price factors and costly information). This also implies that we cover most of the theories discussed in comparable surveys for noneuro area countries, such as in Blinder et al. (1998) in the case of the United States.
Asymmetries -An important aim of all national surveys is to obtain information on the reasons for price changes and on eventual asymmetries. Surveys generally focus on the 8 The share is lower for firms' relationships with consumers. main factors underlying a firm's decision to change its prices. It is possible to compare the relevance of the following factors in determining price increases/decreases: labour costs, cost of raw materials, financial costs, demand, competitors' prices and productivity. This makes it possible to obtain empirical evidence on whether firms in the euro area, facing a shock, behave asymmetrically irrespective of the source of the shock or whether any asymmetry which occurs depends on the nature of the shock.
In summary, the degree of congruence of the national surveys is satisfactory. While not all countries cover all economic sectors, firm sizes and possible questions, the surveys nevertheless allow stylised facts to be obtained for euro area companies on price setting methods, price reviewing and adjusting, reasons for price stickiness, asymmetries in price changes and on the dispersion of pricing patterns across sectors, firm size and the degree of market competition. The results are presented in a normalised way, i.e. excluding the nonresponses, to facilitate comparability across countries.
Main results

Price setting
Price setting rules
New-Keynesian models with sticky prices assume monopolistic competition in order to make price a strategic variable for firms. In this context, firms set their prices as a mark-up over marginal costs and they therefore have some room for not adjusting if facing a variation in costs. On the contrary, in the case of perfect competition, all firms belonging to the same market set their prices at a unique market clearing level; there would be no mark-up, prices always being equal to marginal costs, and price rigidities would not arise.
All questionnaires address the issue of how companies set their prices. In some cases (BE, ES, LU, NL, AT, PT), firms were first asked to indicate whether they have an independent price setting policy, or whether their price is either regulated or set by the main company of the same group, or dictated by the main customer.
Firms with an independent price-setting policy are asked to specify whether their price is set as a margin (mark-up) on costs or depends on the price of their main competitor(s) or is set according to other strategies. 9 In the remaining countries, firms were directly asked to indicate their price setting rule, choosing from among the above-mentioned options.
The option that the price is set as a margin applied to costs requires some clarification. First, its formulation varies marginally across the national questionnaires. The main reason is that, whereas the theoretical literature refers to the concepts of mark-up and marginal costs, most businessmen might not easily understand this terminology. In order to avoid confusion on the side of respondents, the concept of mark-up has typically been translated into "profit margin" while the concept of marginal costs has been translated into a number of different expressions: "unit variable costs (cost of labour and of other inputs)"; "(variable) unit costs"; "unit variable production costs"; "variable production costs per unit". Second, all country questionnaires investigate whether mark-up pricing is applicable in general terms, except in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, where a distinction is made between constant and variable mark-up.
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The last option (mainly "regulated prices" and "price set by customers") is included in only some questionnaires. Table 4 summarises the results of the national surveys by grouping the answers into three alternatives: "mark-up on costs", "price set according to competitors' prices", and "other".
Stylised fact 1 -Mark-up (constant or variable) pricing is the dominant price setting practice adopted by firms in euro area. The lower the level of competition, the more frequently used this method becomes.
This result confirms findings of similar studies for the United Kingdom and the United States. In the euro area, more than half of the firms fix their price as a mark-up (fixed or variable) over costs. At the two extremes we find Germany (72%) and France (40%). For those countries (Germany and the Netherlands) in which respondents could distinguish between constant and variable mark-up, the latter type dominates. In Belgium and Spain sectoral differences are very limited, whereas in Italy only 16% of firms in the trade sector follow this rule; in the Netherlands this percentage is instead much higher (72%). Notes: (1) Mean share for a "very low" and "low" degree of perceived competition. -(2) Mean share for a "very high" and "high" degree of perceived competition. -(3) For the Netherlands, the percentage of firms adopting a fixed mark-up is considered. -(4) Weighted average (GDP weights).
With respect to the size breakdown, all the national surveys indicate that smaller firms tend to rely more on mark-up pricing than larger ones. This result, however, could be partly spurious, since in our sample large firms are in general found to face a higher degree of competition. Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between the share of firms following a mark-up rule and the degree of market competition. The findings, which are quite homogeneous across countries, are consistent with the idea -often advanced in the theoretical literaturethat in a highly competitive environment firms are essentially price-takers and do not fix their prices as a mark-up over costs.
Stylised fact 2 -Prices of around 30% of euro area firms are shaped by competitors' prices.
The share of firms setting their price according to those of their main competitors ranges from 38% in France to 13% in Portugal. Differences with respect to size are moderate.
Finally, for a minority of respondents the price is set according to "other" rules. The share amounts to only 10% in Germany, while it rises to 26% in Italy, where it is particularly high in the trade and services sectors (49 and 40% respectively). This stems from the strict regulatory framework. The percentage of companies following "other" rules is also generally higher in the case of large firms than in that of small firms.
Price discrimination
One of the main features characterising the price setting mechanism is the presence of some form of price discrimination. Generally, a firm is interested in price discrimination, i.e. in selling two units of the same product at different prices either to the same consumer or to different consumers, in order to extract a higher fraction of consumer surplus than it would obtain if it charged a uniform price.
Price discrimination may take many forms: the price of a product may vary depending on the type of customer, on the geographical area in which it is sold, on the number of units purchased or on the specific time at which it is sold, to name but a few.
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The presence of some form of price discrimination according to the quantity of the product sold and to the type of customer is investigated in several of the national questionnaires and the findings summarised here. For four countries (BE, ES, LU, PT) there are some specific questions which seek to ascertain whether the price setting behaviour of a firm differs across markets. The summary of the responses to these questions is reported in Box 1 on pricing-to-market.
Stylised fact 3 -Price discrimination is a common practice for euro area firms.
The findings presented in Figure 2 strongly reject the use of a uniform pricing scheme as a general rule to describe the price setting behaviour of euro area companies. In particular, in percentage terms, the number of firms setting prices on a case-by-case basis or depending on the quantity of the product sold is, on average, around 80% in the euro area, ranging from 65% in Spain 11 to 92% in Germany. In the other four countries (FR, IT, LU, PT) the figure is around 75%. In all the countries with available data, the frequency of pricing on a case-by-case basis is quite similar to that of pricing schemes based on the quantity sold.
There is not a clear relationship between the extent of price discrimination and the size of the companies, except in Luxembourg. If anything, smaller firms seem to make a slightly more frequent use of differentiated prices in France, Italy and Portugal. More significant differences are found across sectors, although on this point the data is restricted to only three countries. In particular, uniform pricing is, as expected, more common in the retail sector. The share of retailers charging the same prices to all of their customers in Italy and Spain is around 55%, the corresponding figures for the overall samples in those two countries being 19% and 35% respectively. At the other extreme, the share of companies setting their prices on a case-by-case basis or according to the quantity sold is highest in manufacturing, which may explain the high numbers for Germany (Figure 2) . Finally, no clear pattern arises in terms of the relationship between the frequency of price discrimination and the degree of competition. In four countries (DE, ES, LU, PT), the higher the intensity of competition, the higher the use of some forms of price discrimination. However, in France the lowest proportion of firms applying uniform pricing is found for those with an intermediate degree of competition. In Italy, the opposite is found: firms facing an intermediate degree of competition display the highest proportion of uniform pricing.
Box 1 -Pricing-to-market: results for Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal
The law of one price states that, adjusted for exchange rates, the price of a product must be the same throughout the world. A substantial amount of empirical studies reject the validity of this law in the short run. A common explanation of departures from the law of one price is that transaction (arbitrage) costs between different geographical markets are high enough that firms can price-discriminate across the countries. In other words, when national markets are segmented by transport costs or other barriers, export firms are able to set a different price in each market. "Pricing to market" is the usual term in the literature for this pricesetting behaviour.
Given the open-economy nature of most European economies, the issue of the price-setting behaviour of exporters seems a relevant one. The surveys conducted in Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg and Spain include some specific questions, directed at firms operating in more than one market, which may provide valuable insight into this issue.
Firstly, questionnaires for Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg ask whether the price charged in different countries is the same or not. As Table B1 shows, around 60% of the exporting firms do apply some form of pricing to market. As Aucremanne and Druant (2004) point out, this is a high proportion given that the exports of the countries considered are mostly directed towards the euro area. Price discrimination is even more frequent in the case of firms selling outside the euro area. In the Spanish sample, 70% of companies exporting to non-euro area countries charge different prices across countries. In the case of Portugal, the question is put differently. It only involves those firms exporting to countries outside the euro area, which are asked what would happen to the local price of their product in the selected country if the euro appreciated by 5%. For about 60% of the firms, the price would either remain unchanged or increase by less than 5%.
The questionnaires in the four countries include a question on the importance of several factors in explaining differentiated price setting between markets. Table B2 reports the average scores of the different factors. One interesting observation is that the ranking is quite homogeneous in the four countries.
Fact 1 -Competitors' prices on the foreign market and transportation costs are the most relevant reasons underlying pricing-to-market behaviour.
Competitors' market prices and transportation costs seem to be the most relevant determinants; cyclical fluctuations in country demand rank immediately below.
Exchange rate developments and structural market conditions have a moderate importance regarding the decision to apply pricing to market. Exchange rate movements receive a higher score for those firms exporting outside the euro area. Nevertheless, even for these firms this factor is ranked below -at least in the Spanish sample -competitors' prices and demand. Finally, the local market tax system is uniformly singled out as the least important factor for explaining price differences across countries. As Aucremanne and Druant (2004) indicate, this factor is more important in consumer-oriented firms, for which differences in indirect taxation are presumably more relevant.
Price adjustment
Time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing rules
This section focuses on how firms review their prices. The theoretical literature considers mainly two types of behaviours: time-dependent pricing rules and state-dependent ones. According to the former, either with a deterministic (Taylor, 1980) or stochastic (Calvo, 1983) process of price adjustment, firms review their prices periodically, i.e. the timing of the review is exogenous and does not depend on the state of the economy. By contrast, under state-dependent pricing rules firms review their prices after the occurrence of a shock.
With price adjustment costs, state-dependent models assume that firms change their prices only when the latter get sufficiently "out of line". Price reviews are a lot more frequent than price changes, as firms want to be aware of shocks in order to react as fast as possible. In time-dependent models, firms review and change their prices only on a periodic basis. In the presence of shocks, time-dependent pricing rules might lead to stickier prices than state-dependent ones. Hence, almost every national questionnaire investigates whether firms follow mainly time-dependent, state-dependent pricing rules, or a combination of both.
In this latter case, the idea is that firms can follow time-dependent pricing rules as an implementation of state-dependent rules under a stable environment (as in Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977) rather than purely time-dependent ones. To distinguish between these two groups, in some national questionnaires firms were asked whether they switch to statedependent rules in the occurrence of specific events.
Given that the firms which follow mainly time-dependent rules or both strategies are supposed to introduce more rigidity in the price transmission mechanism than those which follow mainly state-dependent rules, our analysis focuses on cross-country comparisons of the share of mainly time-dependent firms (Table 5a ) and of those which follow both types of rules (Table 5b) .
Stylised fact 4 -Around half of the firms review their prices following both time and state-dependent rules; less than 40% do it on a "mainly" time-dependent basis.
The share of firms following time-dependent rules is 33% in the euro area as a whole; roughly 40% for five countries (FR, IT, NL, AT, PT) and around or below 1/3 for four countries (BE, DE, ES, LU). These results are in line with those obtained by Blinder et al. (1998) , who found that in the United States the percentage of firms with meaningful periodic price reviews is 40%. 12 The results are also consistent with the figures obtained for Sweden by Apel et al. (2001) , as only 23% of the firms are found to follow time-dependent pricing rules when significant events occur. The results for the United Kingdom by Hall et al. (2000) are not consistent, however, with all the previous ones, as 79% of the firms are found to be time-dependent (10% of the firms are found to follow both time and state-dependent pricing rules and 11% state-dependent rules ) .
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The share of firms following mainly time-dependent rules generally increases slightly with the size of the firm when the number of employees is greater than 50; it is higher for services than for trade (except for Belgium) and higher for trade than for industry (except for Italy). There is therefore no clear-cut evidence on the relationship between pricing rules and the degree of market competition.
Five national surveys (BE, IT, LU, AT, PT) provide data on the information set on which firms base their pricing decisions when they review their prices. This is an important piece of evidence, as deviations from a fully optimising behaviour can be an additional source of stickiness in the response of inflation to shocks. Notes: (1) Weighted average (GDP weights).
Stylised fact 5 -More than half of the firms review their prices taking into account a wide range of information, including both past and expected economic developments; one third of them adopt a backward-looking behaviour.
12 The gross figure for this share is 60%, but Blinder et al. (1998) remove the 20% of firms that change their prices less frequently than every fourth review and those reporting that they change their prices more frequently than they have price reviews. Indeed, the previous mentioned firms rely as much on reviews based on state-dependent rules as on time-dependent ones. 13 Nevertheless, comparison of the share of mainly time-dependent firms across countries is uneasy because this figure is very sensitive to the interpretation threshold between "mainly time-dependent" and "both time and state-dependent".
On average, 55% of the firms evaluate their prices on the basis of an information set that includes expectations on the future economic context (Table 6 ). The share is 68% in Italy, 51% in Austria, 48% in Portugal, 43% in Luxembourg and 34% in Belgium.
A large fraction of firms (about one-third), however, is not forward-looking, taking only historic data into account. Deviations from a fully optimising behaviour are also evident from the results available for only three countries, which indicate that a "rule of thumb" (such as indexation based on the consumer price index, a fixed percentage adaptation, etc.) is used by 37% of firms in Belgium, 27% in Luxembourg and 23% in Portugal.
Information available only for Germany signals that smaller firms tend to be more backward-looking than larger ones and, conversely, larger firms tend to attach more importance than smaller ones to expectations on future conditions in assessing their prices.
How often do firms review their prices?
All national surveys contain a question about how often firms following time-dependent rules assess their prices, giving respondents the possibility to choose from several categories (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc).
14 Table 7 groups the results into three classes: the share of respondents that review their price a maximum of three times per year; between four and eleven times per year; and at least twelve times per year.
Stylised fact 6 -In most countries the modal number of price reviews lies in the range of one to three times a year. There are some significant differences across sectors, with services firms reviewing prices less often than the others. Firms facing high competitive pressures review their prices more frequently.
In all countries, the vast majority of firms review their prices a maximum of three times per year (57% for the euro area as a whole).
With respect to the median frequency of price reviews, countries can be classified into three groups: in Belgium, Spain and Italy the median firm checks its price once a year, while in France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria checks are carried out on a quarterly basis; German and Portuguese firms fall between the two. In order to find regularities in the price-reviewing pattern in the euro area, we investigated whether the firms' size, sector and competitive environment have an effect on their reviewing behaviour. We applied a Chi-square test to examine whether the distribution of frequencies was equal in terms of the aforementioned characteristics. While the size of the firm does not matter in most countries, it explains differences in the reviewing behaviour in France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria. In three of these four countries (except France) large firms review their prices more frequently than small and medium-sized firms.
With regard to the degree of competition, firms facing higher competitive pressures review their prices more frequently. 15 In seven out of the nine countries, those firms indicating that competitors' prices are very important in affecting their own pricing decisions review their prices more often than other firms. The exceptions are Austria and Belgium, where the competitive environment does not give rise to any difference in the reviewing behaviour.
Finally, there are some interesting differences across sectors. The Chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis of equality across sectors in all seven countries for which this analysis is possible (except Germany and France) at the 10% significance level. In five countries (IT, LU, NL, AT, PT), services firms review their prices significantly less frequently than firms operating in other sectors. This tendency can also be observed in the remaining countries (BE, ES) but the results are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels. In Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, firms in the trade sector review their prices significantly more often than firms in other sectors. This is not the case for the other two countries that report results for trade (BE, IT).
There may be different reasons for the reported relatively low frequency of price reviews. On the one hand, the frequency could be related to the (potentially sporadic) arrival of information. In other words, it may not make sense for firms to review their prices more often, as no additional information is available. 16 On the other hand, there may be costs associated with price reviews. In the presence of informational costs, it may be optimal for firms to forego the most topical information instead of incurring these costs. This issue is investigated in Section 3.2.5.
How often do firms change their prices?
All national surveys, except that for Germany, contain a question on the number of price changes per year. 17 In particular, five questionnaires (BE, ES, LU, NL, AT) ask about the average number of price changes per year in recent years and three (IT, FR, PT) the number of price changes in a given year. Table 8 groups the results into four categories: (1) no price change; (2) one price change; (3) two or three price changes; and (4) at least four price changes per year.
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Stylised fact 7 -Most firms change their prices once a year. There are, however, sectoral differences, prices being stickier in the services sector and more flexible in the trade sector. In most countries, firms facing strong competitive pressures adjust their prices more frequently.
The country results are very homogenous with the exception of Germany, where a different source of data was used for this specific information (see footnote 17). On average, 40% of the firms in the euro area change their prices once a year (the percentage share rises 15 We use the degree of perceived competition as an explanatory variable. 16 Kashyap (1995) rejects this hypothesis. He observes different reviewing behaviour also with regard to products having similar cost and demand characteristics. However, if products are alike then the arrival of the necessary information should also be correlated. 17 Since the German questionnaire does not contain a question on the number of price changes, the figures in Table 8 concerning Germany are based on the number of months with price changes in 2003, reported by the same sample of firms as in the Ifo business survey. The figures are quite different from those obtained for the rest of the countries, probably on account of the particularly low demand faced by German firms in that year. 18 The categories in Table 8 are not the same as those used in Table 7 , since the number of price changes in most countries is considerably lower than that of price reviews.
51% if Germany is excluded from the computation of the mean). In all countries except
Germany and Luxembourg, approximately 70% of the respondents adjust their prices a maximum of once a year. Only around 10% of the firms change their prices more frequently. The median firm changes its price once a year for all countries. 19 These results are in line with the findings of Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden, Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States and Hall et al. (1997) for the United Kingdom, who also find that the modal number of actual price changes per year lies at the yearly frequency.
As with price reviews, we also focus on whether there are common features underlying differences in price changing behaviour across countries. Again, the firms' size is not relevant in most countries. Conversely, the competitive environment and the sector help to explain differences in the frequency of price changes. The results are in line with those obtained for price reviews. With the exceptions of Austria and Portugal, in all countries firms facing strong competitive pressures tend to change their prices significantly more often than those not subject to such pressures. In all seven countries where the data covers more than one sector, the Chi-square test for the equality of the distribution of price-change frequencies across sectors rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level, pointing to significant sectoral differences. In five countries (BE, IT, LU, AT, PT) firms in the services sector change their prices less frequently than firms in other sectors; in four countries (ES, IT, LU, NL) firms operating in the trade sector change their prices more frequently than firms in other sectors.
The relationship between price reviews and price changes
Stylised fact 8 -Price changes are less frequent than price reviews.
All countries report that price reviews are conducted more frequently than price changes. Even with the classified data used, at the euro area level the share of firms changing their prices less than quarterly (a maximum number of three times per year) is 86%, compared with 60% of firms reviewing their prices with the same frequency ( Table 9) . Similar evidence is found in all but two countries.
All in all, the evidence provided in this section is consistent with the notion that price adjustment takes place at two stages. First, the firms review their prices to check whether they are at the optimal level or need to be changed. As shown in Section 3.2.2, they do this at discrete time intervals (the majority of firms less than four times per year). Thus, some kind of stickiness can already be observed at the first stage of price setting.
Once the price review has taken place, firms may change their prices. However, they do so less frequently than they review the prices. One possibility why prices are left unchanged may be because there is no reason to change them. 20 However, prices may also be left unchanged because, even once firms have decided to incur the informational costs of the review, there are other factors preventing price adjustment. Such factors are addressed in the next section. 
Why do firms decide not to change prices?
The economic literature provides manifold explanations for sticky prices. As Blinder (1991) points out, however, it is difficult to evaluate how close the various theories come to the obstacles to changing prices encountered in the real world (one problem being observational equivalence). Thus, Blinder applied the interview method as a new way of examining the empirical relevance of different theories. 21 He explained selected theories in face-to-face interviews with managers and assumed that they would recognise the line of reasoning if it came close to their way of thinking. All the national surveys on which this paper is based apply similar methodologies, presenting managers with different theories chosen according to their relevance in the economic literature, as well as their rankings in the surveys already conducted for other countries (Apel et al., 2001; Blinder et al., 1998; and Hall et al., 1997) .
All nine questionnaires asked the managers a question along the following lines: "If there are reasons for changing the price of your main product, which of the following factors may well prevent an immediate price adjustment?". The list following this question offers a series of statements, expressed in simple terms, based on different theories. The respondents could indicate their degree of agreement for each statement, choosing from among four categories: unimportant (1), of minor importance (2), important (3) and very important (4), where the numbers in brackets indicate the scores attached to each category. 22 The mean scores attached by the firms in each country to the various theories form the basis of the ranking shown in Table 10 , which also gives the average ranking for the euro area. Based on this ranking, two groups of theories can be defined: the first consists of those theories which have an average score well above two, while the second comprises the remaining ones. The last three columns of the table show the ranking of the same theories in the surveys by Blinder et al. (1998) for the United States, Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden and Hall et al. (1997) for the United Kingdom.
Stylised fact 9 -Implicit and explicit contracts, cost-based pricing and co-ordination failure are the most relevant explanations for sticky prices, while menu costs, pricing thresholds and costly information are not recognised as important by the respondents.
20 Although almost all national surveys address the issue of price reviews and price changes while referring to "normal conditions", in most cases it is not possible to control for the fact that the observed price behaviour is in fact related to the occurrence of particular shocks, either of a idiosyncratic nature or of a common one. 21 A detailed description of these theories can be found in Blinder et al. (1998) . 22 In the Dutch questionnaire the scaling is more detailed (from 1 to 10). Results have been re-scaled for comparability.
The theory of "implicit contracts" has the highest average score (2.6) and ranks first in four country questionnaires. The theory is based on the idea that firms establish long-run relationships with customers in order to make future sales more predictable; in other words, they try to win customer loyalty simply by changing prices as little as possible. Okun (1981) , who was the first to apply this idea to prices other than wages, says: "Continuity and reliability are vital to all these arrangements" (Okun, 1981, p. 151) . Customers are attracted by a constant price because it helps them to minimise search costs (e.g. shopping time) with the result that they focus on the long-term average price rather than on the spot price. This is consistent with the data presented in Table 3 , which shows that most of the firms have some sort of long-term relationship with their customers. Note: (1) The ranking of the theories is based on the unweighted average of countries' scores.
"Explicit contracts" (firms have to re-negotiate a contract to change their prices) as an explanation for sticky prices is the second most important factor at the euro area level (with an average score of 2.5).
Nearly the same average score (2.4) is attributed to "cost-based pricing" and "coordination failure". Cost-based pricing implies that prices do not change if costs do not change or that they respond only with a lag to cost changes. In the case of co-ordination failure, the idea is that firms prefer not to change their prices as long as none of their competitors moves first. If a firm is the only one to increase its price after a shock it may stand to loose customers; on the other hand, a single-handed price reduction might spark off a price war, which could in the end be detrimental to the firm's profits. 23 Without a coordinating mechanism that allows firms to move together, prices may remain fixed.
Each of the four theories forming the top group in Table 10 ranks either first or second in the studies conducted outside the euro area (Apel et al., 2001; Blinder et al., 1998; Hall et al., 1997) .
Beside the top group, the theories labelled "judging quality by price" and "temporary shocks" -i.e. the idea that a firm may not want to change its price as it may have to change it soon in the opposite direction -are regarded as quite relevant by the respondents (both have an average score of 2.0).
The remaining four theories are not considered as important obstacles to price adjustment by the euro area firms. This group includes prominent candidates such as "physical menu costs" and "costly information". Although they are frequent explanations for price stickiness in the theoretical literature, in practice they seem to be of minor importance.
The importance attached to the various theories differs only slightly across sectors. In the goods sector, the ranking is very similar to the overall one, with small differences only within the group of low-ranked theories. This should not come as a surprise, since the goods sector is the dominant sector in nearly all country surveys. Similarly, in the services sector there seem to be only minor differences with respect to the overall ranking. Larger differences appear instead in the ranking given to the theories by firms operating in the trade sector: explicit contracts are of minor importance, while co-ordination failure, pricing thresholds and temporary shocks receive higher scores than in the other sectors.
The similarity of our results to those obtained by other surveys, together with the fact that the national surveys for the euro area were conducted in very different ways, is an indication of the robustness of our findings. This is further supported by the fact that the ordering of the theories (i.e. the ordering of the answer-categories) differs considerably across the various questionnaires. For example, in the Dutch questionnaire the theory of implicit contracts is the second answer-category, while it appears in ninth place in the Austrian questionnaire. In both country studies, the theory is regarded as the best explanation. Overall, we do not find an association between the ordering of the answercategories and the importance attached to the theories by respondents.
The ranking given by firms to the various factors behind price stickiness provides some evidence on whether these factors have a greater bearing on the first or the second stage of price adjustment. Ball and Mankiw (1994, p. 142) suggest that "the most important costs of price adjustment are the time and attention required of managers to gather the relevant information and to make and implement decisions". Our analysis reveals that, for the majority of the firms, the main obstacles lie elsewhere. In fact, five countries include the theory labelled "information costs", i.e. costs associated with gathering information for pricing decisions (stage one of price adjustment), which always receives one of the lowest scores, in their questionnaires; the same is found in Apel et al. (2001) . In conclusion, the main impediments to price adjustment seem to concern more the second stage of price setting, the most relevant impediments being implicit and explicit contracts (which can be considered as nominal rigidities), cost-based pricing and co-ordination failure (both of which belong more to the category of real rigidities).
Asymmetries in price adjustment
How do companies respond to changes in factors underlying the price-setting process? Are reactions different, depending on whether prices have to be increased or decreased? This section aims to clarify these issues, which are important from the point of view of the conduct of monetary policy, since asymmetries in price changes may imply, in the short term, different impacts of positive or negative monetary policy shocks.
The theoretical literature tends to support the view that price changes are asymmetrical, for several reasons. First, asymmetrical pricing behaviour may be due to strategic interaction between firms. Rotemberg and Saloner (1997) , for example, show that in a duopoly the incentives for competitors to adjust the price level to a shock in costs are greater than in a monopoly. 24 Second, asymmetries can arise because of the presence of capacity constraints (Finn, 1996) . Finally, menu-cost models, such as Ball and Mankiw (1994) , can also lead to asymmetrical price changes.
In the context of the IPN, some evidence of asymmetrical pricing behaviour emerges from the analysis of CPI micro data (Dhyne et al., 2004) . Price reductions seem to be moderately less frequent than price increases (40% of price changes are price reductions). Asymmetries are also found with respect to the size of price changes, as average price increases tend to be smaller than average price decreases. All in all, prices tend to increase more frequently but by a smaller amount. There is also considerable dispersion across sectors.
The information gathered directly at the firm level through our questionnaires sheds some light on the importance of asymmetries in price changes since it permits an assessment of the relevance of a number of factors (labour costs, raw material costs, financial costs, demand conditions, competitors' strategies) as driving forces behind upwards or downwards price movements. 
Descriptive evidence
All the national surveys investigated the presence of asymmetries, distinguishing between cost factors (labour costs, raw material costs and financial costs) and market conditions (demand and competitors' prices). Firms were asked to give a score to each of these factors according to their importance in determining price increases and decreases.
In this section we analyse the evidence on asymmetries starting with manufacturing, as this sector is included in all national surveys. Next, we take a euro area perspective and investigate whether asymmetries depend on the type of sector or on a firm's size.
Stylised fact 10 -For manufacturers in the euro area cost shocks are more relevant for price increases than for price decreases, while shocks to market conditions matter more when prices have to be decreased.
There is evidence of asymmetries in pricing behaviour in the manufacturing sector: labour costs and raw material costs are the dominant sources of price increases, while financial costs are of minor importance; conversely, price decreases are mainly affected by weakening demand or decreasing competitors' prices. Figure 3 subtracts for each factor the reported scores for price rises and declines and shows a regular pattern of positive asymmetries for costs and negative asymmetries for market conditions.
In Figures 4 to 6, a euro area perspective is taken, with a distinction across sectors (goods, trade and other services) and size classes (1-49 employees, 50-199 employees and 200 or more employees). The figures are derived by calculating -for each sector and size class -means across countries. The means are unweighted to prevent one or two countries from dominating the overall results.
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Interestingly, the patterns found in the case of manufacturing are also present in the other sectors and are consistent across company sizes. At the euro area level, firms are more likely to change their prices in response to shocks that lead to profit losses (rising costs, weakening demand and decreasing competitors' prices) than to shocks leading to profit gains (decreasing costs, improving demand conditions and increasing competitors' prices).
The national surveys were conducted in periods (see Appendix A for details) characterised by substantially different growth rates across the nine countries and, despite these differences in business cycle conditions at the times of the surveys, they produced very similar results. In other words, the answers provided by the respondents concerning the reaction of their prices to worsening market conditions do not seem to be affected by the economic outlook in the period in which the firms were surveyed. Finally, we expect the degree of competition to be important in shaping pricing behaviour. As the differences between countries are limited, we only present average scores across countries here. The influence of competition on asymmetries is shown separately for price-raising shocks in Figure 7 and price-decreasing shocks in Figure 8 . Both figures present scores for two types of firms, one experiencing severe perceived competition and the other experiencing no or very limited perceived competition.
Stylised fact 11 -Firms in highly competitive markets respond more strongly to changes in underlying factors.
The figures show that the degree of competition indeed matters. Differences between the two groups of firms are greatest in the case of price-decreasing shocks, especially on the demand side. Interestingly, the results of the national surveys suggest that price responses to labour cost shocks are more or less the same for both groups. An explanation might be that in most euro area countries wage adjustments are the outcome of yearly or half-yearly collective bargaining agreements at the national or sectoral level. The information about the frequency of price changes is interesting because it gives an indication of how often firms actually change the price of their main product. However, it contains little information about price stickiness, as we do not know the frequency of shocks in the period under investigation.
An interesting question in this respect is the following: "If your firm is hit by a significant shock, how much time passes before you adjust your prices?". Four country surveys (ES, FR, AT, PT) analyse this issue. They include four questions, similar to the above, in order to distinguish between cost and demand shocks as well as upward and downward shocks. Firms are asked whether they change their prices in reaction to shocks or not. If they adjust their prices after a shock, they are requested to indicate the number of months elapsing before the price change is implemented. The results of these two questions are summarised in Tables B2.a and B2.b.
Apart from differences in terms of the direction and the source of the shock, there are country-specific differences: while the median firm changes its price one to three months after the shock in France, Austria and Portugal, the median firm in Spain waits for more than three months before adjusting its price. Thus, an adjustment process of one period in macro models for France, Austria and Portugal and of two or more periods in macro models for Spain using quarterly data seem to be justified on the ground of our findings. These results are all statistically significant at the 5% level.
This evidence suggests that firms tend to worry more about receding than increasing demand and care more about higher than lower production costs, confirming the findings of Section 3.3.1. Compared with surveys in other countries, the Dutch survey contains detailed information about small companies, including the smallest one-person firms. In the Netherlands there are quite a number of one-person firms (around 40% of the business population). In terms of value added, the share is smaller but nevertheless significant. About 55% of the one-person firms offer business-to-business services, 20% are active in retail non-food and catering, 12% in wholesale or transport, 5% in retail food and catering, and so on. Hoeberichts and Stokman (2004) present evidence that these firms have the most rigid prices. Only one out of five of these firms changes its prices more than once a year and price decreases are relatively rare. Not only in comparison with large firms, but even within the group of small firms, one-person companies are exceptional (Figures B5.a and B5.b) . Price responses by one-person firms to cost shocks are by far the weakest, both in the case of downward and upward pressures. The response to changes in demand or competitors' prices is stronger, especially under worsening market conditions, and is more in line with that of larger companies. In over 80% of the sample, the employer and employee are one and the same person, which explains why they are relatively insensitive to labour cost shocks. Moreover, for many one-person firms raw materials are of little importance, probably reflecting the fact that they mostly operate in the services sector. Finally, the weak responsiveness to financial costs can be explained by the fact that small companies rely to a great extent on their own financial resources. 
Econometric results
For three countries (FR, IT, AT) there is further evidence of the asymmetrical behaviour of prices in response to different shocks, obtained from the estimation of simple probit models of the general form:
where F is the cumulative function of the normal distribution, y j is a zero-one dummy denoting the probability of observing a change in firm j's price in response to a demand or a cost shock and x ij represents a set of i explanatory variables for firm j, which might influence the way in which prices react to shocks. Among these variables, a number of factors capturing some form of real rigidity are considered (the degree of market competition, the shape of the marginal cost function, the relationships with customers 27 ) in order to test the hypothesis, often expressed in the theoretical literature, that real rigidity magnifies nominal rigidity. Moreover, the analysis investigates whether some form of "pricing-to-market" behaviour might lead to price stickiness. The model is estimated separately for upward and downward demand and cost shocks. The main results from this exercise are summarised in Table 11 . First, price stickiness, in response to demand shocks, is higher when the degree of market competition is lower. This is not always the case for cost shocks. Second, real rigidities, as captured by a flat marginal cost curve, on the one hand, and by the fact that customers incur high search costs, on the other, reduce the responsiveness of prices to positive demand shocks. Third, some form of pricing-to-market rigidity seems to lower nominal price flexibility in response to cost shocks. Finally, an important form of asymmetry in the responsiveness of prices to changes in cost and demand emerges: while a demand increase is less likely to induce a price change than a demand decrease, a cost increase is much more likely to prompt a price change than a cost decrease. In other words, price responsiveness to changes in costs is greater when the changes are positive than when they are negative, while in the case of demand changes prices seem to be more rigid upwards than downwards. Note: (1)"+" denotes that the factor is positively and significantly related to the probability of a price increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs; "-" denotes that the factor is negatively and significantly related to the probability of a price increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs; "no" denotes that the factor is not significantly related to the probability of a price increase/decrease in response to an increase/decrease in demand/costs.
Box 4 -Food prices: findings for Spain, France and Italy
In most national surveys the food-producing sector is typically included in manufacturing. Food prices, however, might have a quite distinct pattern from the rest of manufacturing, for example because they are more sensitive to supply shocks. This is the reason why, for instance, in the analysis of consumer inflation they are often analysed separately (as well as the energy products) from the other items. On the basis of the survey, the findings for Spain, France and Italy, reveal a few specific characteristics in the price-setting behaviour for food products:
• food industries in France and Italy mostly conduct their business at the national level, whereas for the other manufacturing firms foreign markets are also relatively important for the sales of their main products; • in Spain and Italy the share of food-processing firms reporting that they set the same price for all customers is higher than for other manufacturing firms (in France a clear pattern does not emerge); • in all three countries food prices are reviewed and changed with a higher frequency than other manufactured goods.
Conclusions
This study investigates the pricing behaviour of firms, based on the responses of around 10,000 euro area companies to highly comparable surveys conducted by nine Eurosystem NCBs.
The information collected, following interviews with firms about their pricing strategies, sheds light on important aspects that cannot not be assessed otherwise and which are complementary to those that can be investigated using either micro or aggregate data. The data provides evidence -mostly of a qualitative nature -on a number of relevant aspects, such as price-setting practices, price-adjustment mechanisms, reasons for price stickiness and asymmetries in pricing behaviour, with a focus on differences across sectors, firm size, degree of market competition.
The evidence appears to be very robust across countries and not affected by the differences in the national questionnaires and by the business cycle conditions prevailing in the countries at the time of the survey. Consequently, it is possible to draw some conclusions for the euro area as a whole, a summary of which is given below.
Mark-up behaviour dominates alternative price-setting practices, assuming greater importance as the degree of market competition diminishes. For a considerable number of firms, however, prices are shaped by those of competitors.
Around half of the firms surveyed review their prices according to both time and statedependent rules; less than 40% do it "mainly" on a time-dependent basis. Although the majority of firms take into account a wide range of information, including past and expected economic developments, about one third adopts a purely backward-looking behaviour.
There is strong evidence of price stickiness. Across the nine countries considered in this study, the median firm reviews its price on a quarterly basis at most. Service firms and those facing weaker competitive pressures review their prices less frequently. Price changes take place at a lower frequency than price reviews; most firms change their prices once a year.
Among the main factors identified by theoretical literature as obstacles to price adjustment, those most readily recognised by respondents are implicit and explicit contracts, cost-based pricing and co-ordination failure. Menu costs, pricing thresholds and costly information, on the other hand, are not considered to be important elements.
Price changes are asymmetrical, as often claimed in the theoretical literature. In particular, cost shocks are more relevant to price increases than to price decreases, while shocks to market conditions -demand and competitors' prices -matter more when prices have to be lowered. Firms in highly competitive markets respond more strongly to changes in underlying factors.
